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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdict ion of this mat te r p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-4-103(2)(h)(2008) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties in this action were married in 1988. With some minor 
exceptions, th roughout the entirety of the marr iage, Husband was self-
employed as a landlord, acquir ing run down rental properties, fixing them u p , 
and then renting and mainta ining them. At the time of the marriage, there 
were three rental properties. Two (2) of them were inherited by Husband , and 
the third was purchased dur ing the marriage with a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. All three properties were run and mainta ined with either Husband ' s 
separate funds, funds generated by the propert ies and kept separate from 
marital funds, or by loans obtained exclusively by Husband . 
The court found tha t the properties inheri ted by Husband were his 
separate property, tha t they had not been commingled, and tha t Wife had not 
augmented, maintained or enhanced their value. The court further found tha t 
the third property was a mari ta l acquisition and tha t its equity was a joint 
asset to be divided. Next, the court found tha t the mari tal residence, which 
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had been Wife's prior to the marriage, had lost its separate quality and its 
equity was a marital asset subject to division. Of the major marital assets, 
Wife was awarded the house and her retirement, and Husband was awarded 
the rental property. To equalize the values of this division, Husband was 
ordered to pay Wife the sum of $9,673. Although Wife has argued that 
Husband received in excess of $1,000,000 in separate property, net of 
mortgage obligation, in reality he received a little more than half of that in 
gross value, and $353,000 in net equity as his separate property. 
Wife was employed by Utah Power and Light during the course of the 
marriage, until she was diagnosed with cancer in March, 1996. At the time of 
trial, she was not employed and receiving disability from a private insurer. No 
evidence was presented that Wife could not work to augment her income, and 
instead, evidence was presented that she did in fact have the skills and ability 
to do so. Her disability income was $1,502 per month and Husband's net 
income was $1,900 per month. Finding that Wife had the ability to at least 
make up the difference in their incomes, the court refused to award Wife 
alimony. 
Finally, determining that each party had a need for attorne}^' fees and 
that Husband had no ability to pay Wife's attorneys fees, the court denied the 
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request. The best source for payment of Wife's fees was the equalizing property 
division payment of $9 ,673 . 
FACTUAL BACKGRC >lI I\I 11 
The parties were marr ied in April, 1988. (Record page 1. Record will 
hereinafter be referred to as "R".) They raised a son, who was nineteen (19) at 
the time of trial. (R. 2.) At the time of their marriage, Wife was working for 
Utah Power and Light and owned a home commonly known as 8526 South 
Colleen Drive in Sandy, Utah. (Trial t ranscript page 33 ; "Trial Transcript" shall 
hereinafter be identified as "TT".) At the time of the marr iage, the home was 
worth $90,000, and Wife had obtained a loan for $64,000 (See Husband ' s 
exhibit number 4, page 1 and TT 80-96.) 
At the time of the marriage, Husband was "working on income properties, 
a landlord." (TT 7) Over the course of the marriage, acquir ing and working on 
income properties was the Husband ' s primary employment, from which he 
earned an income, which income was used to suppor t his family. At time of 
trial, he owned three (3) rental properties (See Respondent ' s exhibits 1, 2 & 6): 
1. 149 South 800 Eas t in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as "149 South") (Respondent 's exhibit 1.) This rental 
property was previously owned by Husband 's father, and H u s b a n d acquired it 
prior to the marriage in 1987. Part of the purchase price was early inheri tance 
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from Husband's father and part was from Husband's commissions from the 
sale of a condominium owned by his father (See Respondent's exhibit 1 and 
Husband's testimony at TT pages 15-17.) When he acquired the property, it 
was literally uninhabitable, and it took five (5) years of work and improvements 
to cause it to meet Code. (TT 18) Husband did all of this work, whether 
personally or by contracting and supervising third parties. (TT 17 & 18) 
2. 244-250 Truman Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as "Truman") (Respondent's exhibit 2.) This property is a 
six plex at 244 East and a small home converted to a duplex at 250 East. (TT 
24-25) It was also owned by Husband's father. The property was 
uninhabitable and Husband's father was receiving notices from the City to 
clean it up or be fined. (TT 21) A family meeting was held between Husband, 
his father and his siblings. (TT 22) After inspecting the property, none of 
Husband's siblings wanted it. (TT 23) Husband did not have the means to 
purchase it, and the family decided that it would be his for $45,000 as part of 
his inheritance. Shortly thereafter, the roof collapsed, and $5,000 was 
deducted from the value. (TT 23-24) At the death of Husband's father, 
Husband's siblings each received $66,452 and Husband received $26,266, 
reflective of his having the Truman property as agreed. (See Respondent's 
exhibit 2 and Husband's testimony at TT 21-26 & 49.) 
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3. 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "157 South".) This property was previously a nursing home. (TT 
27) The home has zoning problems that cannot be cured and is subject to 
being shut down at any time. (TT 31) As a result, the previous owner sold it to 
Husband for $65,000 despite the fact that the County assessment showed a 
value of $150,000. (TT 29) It was purchased by Husband pursuant to Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts. (See Respondent's exhibit 2.) Husband paid $5,000 
down from a line of credit secured by Truman Avenue, and all remaining 
payments were made from proceeds of the rental units. (Respondent's exhibit 
6 and Husband's testimony at TT 27-32.) 
With each of these three (3) rental properties, the evidence is clear that: 
A. Husband maintained title solely in his name (See 
Respondent's exhibits 1, 2 & 6); 
B. Husband opened and maintained bank accounts for each 
property, solely in his name (TT 63-64); 
C. Husband did all of the work in improving the properties, 
either personally or by obtaining and supervising subcontractors (TT 17, 
18 &65); 
P All expenses of the properties and the costs of all 
improvements were paid either from the proceeds of the properties or 
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from loans obtained on the properties in the Husband ' s sole name (TT 
63 , 49 & 74); 
E. Wife's name was not on any b a n k account a n d she had no 
access (TT 63); 
F. Wife did not contribute financially to any of the properties 
(TT64); 
G. Wife did no work personally on any of the propert ies with the 
exception of one-half (1/2) day painting at 149 South, for which there 
was a dispute a s to whether Husband paid her for her t ime (TT 64). Wife 
did testify tha t one (1) time she wallpapered a t T ruman a n d cleaned u p 
there a couple of t imes. Husband denied Wife did anything at the 
Truman property (TT 264, 265); 
H. Wife never showed or rented the properties, a n d she never 
collected rent (TT 264); and 
I. Wife referred to the type of t e n a n t s these propert ies at t racted 
as "those people" (TT 176) and would not allow Husband to use the 
part ies ' home telephone number in adver t i sements to r en t the properties. 
(TT64) (See also TT 264.) 
The other parcel of real property at i ssue a t trial was the home and real 
property commonly known as 8526 South Colleen Drive, Sandy, Utah. (See 
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exhibit 4 ) This property was Wife's prior to the marriage, and also prior to the 
marriage, she obtained a mortgage m the a m o u n t of $64 ,000 The value of the 
home at the time was $90 ,000 (See pages 1 & 2 to Respondent ' s exhibit 4 and 
TT 80-84 ) Within the first two (2) years of marriage, Wife approached 
Husband about investing $20 ,000 for improvements to the home, and thereby 
purchasing one-half (1/2) of the equity Husband agreed (TT 34) By 1988, 
Husband had paid his $20 ,000 in full, (from borrowing from his father, some 
inheritance money, a n d the sale of one (1) of his vehicles) (TT 35-37) Over 
time, the parties pitched the roof, pulled the garage forward, and pu t m a new 
door system and new siding (TT 35) The part ies also pu rchased for the home 
a new furnace, new carpet , paint , hardwood floors, new tiles, air conditioning, 
refrigerator, furniture from RC Willey and a new dryer (TT 35 & exhibit 6) In 
support of his claims, H u s b a n d presented copies of all checks and receipts as 
part of Respondent 's exhibit 6 
Husband testified t ha t the parties had always kept their finances 
separate He testified t ha t he wanted to do it this way as he was Wife's fifth 
(5th) husband (TT 171) They had separate b a n k accounts , separa te credit 
cards, they filed their taxes separately, and nei ther had any ongoing knowledge 
of what the other did with their money (TT 137) When it came to contributing 
to the marital home, H u s b a n d and wife contr ibuted from their separa te funds 
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As part of exhibit 6, Husband provided documentation that he contributed an 
average per month of $406 to $750 to household expenses from July, 1988 to 
November, 1994. After November, 1994, Husband paid the mortgage payment 
in full and all utilities every month until the separation of the parties in April, 
2006, and he was contributing to other household expenses as well. (See 
exhibit 6 and TT 87-88.) 
While the Husband was investing in the home, Wife was refinancing 
without his knowledge. In June of 1993, Wife refinanced the underlying 
mortgage and borrowed additional monies totaling $74,250. The extra money 
was used to pay off Wife's credit card debts. On March 8, 2001, Wife obtained 
an equity line of credit in the amount of $25,000 and used the money to pay off 
her credit card debt. In November, 2004, Wife refinanced the equity line to 
borrow $30,000, once again using the money to pay off her credit card debt. 
Finally, on March 22, 2006, one (1) month before the separation of the parties, 
Wife refinanced and borrowed $164,000. This paid off the first (1st) mortgage, 
the equity line of credit, and she received $52,227.65, which she once again 
used to pay off her credit card debt. (See exhibit 4 and TT at 90-96 & 122.) 
Wife argued that the "cannibalization" of the equity in the home was 
necessary because Husband contributed so little to the household expenses, 
and that she had to make up the difference by using credit cards. However, 
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Wife provided no documentat ion whatsoever to suppor t her test imony and had 
to admit tha t she did have charges on those cards relating to the raising, 
breeding, selling and showing her Sheltie dogs. (TT 249-251) 
At the time of trial, Wife was receiving disability income of $1,502 per 
month. Husband ' s gross income for 2007 was $29,852 for a gross monthly 
income of $2,487.72 and a net income of approximately $1,900. (See exhibit 8 
and TT at 124.) His tax r e tu rns showed tha t his income for 2006 was $29,055 
(see exhibit 9 and TT at 131), and his 2005 income was $31 ,289 .65 . (See 
exhibit 10 and TT at 131.) As a resul t of the order of temporary relief tha t he 
pay alimony to the Petitioner in the a m o u n t of $514, he was forced to get a par t 
time job. (See exhibit 11 and 12 and TT at 132 to 133.) Wife's expenses varied 
depending upon which Financial Declaration was used, from $2,076 in April of 
2006, to $3 ,096 in J u n e , 2006 (See left side of file in Volume 2 of Record) and 
$3,243 in July, 2007. (See exhibit 18.) Wife blamed the discrepancies on her 
former attorney. (TT 214) Husband ' s expenses were $3 ,093.73 per month 
when he was paying alimony of $514 per month , or $2 ,579.73 without. 
(Respondent's exhibit 12 and TT 133.) 
Wife submit ted no medical evidence tha t she was incapable of working in 
addition to receiving her disability, ins tead saying tha t her "doctor had not 
released her" to work. However, on cross examination, she admit ted tha t she 
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has not asked her doctor to do so. (TT. 229) Wife testified that she suffered 
from fatigue and pain, but that there was currently no recurring cancer. (TT 
194 and 230) She further testified that stress prevents her from "sitting at a 
job and working". (TT 232) Yet there was also testimony that in her home, she 
had a fully computerized office, which she used to conduct her hobby/business 
of breeding, buying, raising, selling and showing Sheltie dogs. (TT 98) She had 
sold puppies, but claimed that the income covered only the expenses. (TT 233-
238) Husband testified that in his experience, she would spend up to six (6) 
hours a day at the computer doing things relating to her Shelties. (TT 99) 
Further evidence established that Wife could lift and transport dogs and that 
she had traveled to at least one (1) dog show. (TT 251) The trial court found, 
among other things, that no medical evidence had been presented that Wife 
was so disabled that she could not become employed and contribute to her own 
income; that there was no evidence that employment would disallow her 
disability from a private insurance carrier; and that Wife had not proven that 
she is unable to work. (See R. 447) He denied her claim for alimony. 
Finally, with respect to the issue of attorney's fees, Wife acknowledged 
that there was no account from which fees could be paid. (TT 267) Instead, 
she was asking the court to offset property equity in requiring the Husband to 
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pay her attorney's fees. (TT 276) Wife did have available to her the $9,673 
property equalization payment from Husband (R 447). 
ARGUMENT I 
WIFE ARGUES THAT THE "COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT" BUT DOES NOT ENUMERATE WHICH FINDINGS AND 
DOES NOT MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE. THUS, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE 
ARGUMENTS AND ACCEPT THE FINDINGS AS VALID. 
In a blanket s ta tement , Wife's first issue on appeal is t h a t the trial court 
erred in its Findings of Fact. In the subs tance of the a rgument , Wife simply 
states that those Findings in which the trial court erred will be addressed in 
the individual a rgumen t s relating to the other three i s sues on appeal. 
However, Wife never does so. She never specifies which Findings she claims 
are in error. Husband and this court can only guess t ha t the Findings to 
which Wife refers are any Findings which support the conclusion tha t two (2) of 
the rental un i t s are separa te property, any Findings which suppor t the court 's 
denial of alimony and any Findings which support the cour t ' s refusal to award 
attorneys fees. 
Not only h a s Wife not specified to which Findings she refers, she h a s 
failed to marshal l the evidence supporting those Findings. An appealing party 
has a duty to " 'marshal the evidence in suppor t of the findings and then 
demonstrate tha t despite this evidence, the trial court 's findings are so lacking 
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in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence, t h u s making them 
clearly erroneous"' ". Lefavi v. Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
((quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (quoting In re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 , 886 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).) 
When a party fails to marsha l the evidence in suppor t of the challenged 
findings, this Court "refuse[s] to consider the meri ts of challenges to the 
findings and accept[s] the findings as valid." Lefavi, a t 821 ((citing 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, 872 P.2d 1051 , 1053 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Mountain States Broadcast ing Co. v. Neale, 783 
P.2d 551 , 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).) 
This Court should refuse to consider the meri ts of Wife's challenge and 
accept the trial court 's Findings and decision as valid. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD 
PETITIONER ALIMONY. 
Wife argues on appeal that : 1) the mere fact t ha t she is on disability is 
sufficient proof for the cour t to conclude tha t she canno t sus ta in some type of 
employment to provide for a t least some of her own financial need; 2) Husband 
was "chronically underemployed" for the entirety of the part ies eighteen (18) 
year marriage, and income should be imputed to him on tha t basis ; and 3) now 
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on appeal , Wife argues tha t the court should disallow certain deduct ions taken 
by Husband on his tax re tu rns , and tha t after adding in these deduct ions, 
Husband ' s income is really $50 ,000 to $52,000. 
The problems with these a rgumen t s are: 1) Wife never provided any 
independent evidence tha t she is unab le to work, and the mere fact t ha t she is 
on disability from a private insurance carrier is insufficient to meet her burden 
of proof; 2) the argument tha t Husband was chronically underemployed 
throughout the part ies ' marriage is a two-edged sword. If in fact he was (which 
he denies) this "chronic underemployment" is in fact the s t anda rd of living 
enjoyed by the parties dur ing their marriage; and 3) there is simply no evidence 
in the record which would suppor t a conclusion tha t any deduct ions taken by 
Husband on his tax r e tu rns were excessive or inappropriate other t han Wife's 
testimony tha t she filed her r e tu rns separately because his deduct ions "made 
her nervous". (See TT 212) 
An award of alimony is, of course, based upon the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) which in relevant par t s ta tes : 
The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
i. the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
ii. the recipient 's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
iii. the ability of the payor spouse to provide support ; 
iv. the length of the marriage; 
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Pursuant to subsection (8)(c): "As a general rule, the court should look 
to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining 
alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial." 
An alimony award will not be disturbed on appeal unless an appellant 
can show a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. As set forth in Jensen v. 
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), this court said " Trial courts have 
considerable discretion in determining alimony . . . and [determinations of 
alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated.' " Id. at 119. (quoting Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (alterations in original) and quoting Breinholt v. Breinholt, 
905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).) 
In this case, beginning first with the standard of living enjoyed by the 
parties, it does not matter whether the court uses the standard of living at the 
time of the parties' separation or at time of trial. They were identical. Wife 
began receiving disability income in 1996, or ten (10) years prior to the parties' 
separation and was receiving the same at time of trial. And, "chronically 
underemployed" or not, Husband's employment did not change over the course 
of the marriage. His income did not significantly change from 2005, the year 
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before the parties' separation, through time of trial. The argument that 
Husband was "chronically underemployed" during the marriage is a two edged 
sword, because then the standard of living is defined by that "chronic 
underemployment". Wife cannot insist that Husband change after eighteen 
(18) years of marriage to give the parties a standard of living greater than that 
enjoyed during the marriage. His ability to provide support, from 2005 to time 
of trial remained consistent, and it was reasonable for the court to conclude 
that his net income for purposes of judging his ability to pay alimony was 
$1,900. 
Turning next to Wife's ability to provide for her own need, Wife did not 
present any evidence that she was unable to sustain some type of employment 
despite her disability. There was no medical testimony, and all Wife offered 
was her testimony that she had not been released by her doctor to work. 
However, on cross examination, she had to admit that she had not asked her 
doctor to release her to work. Wife provided no documentation that the 
provider of her disability payments prohibited its recipients to supplement their 
income while receiving such payments. 
Conversely, there was evidence that Wife has significant computer skills, 
with a computerized office in her home, from where she was able to spend up 
to six (6) hours per day engaging in her hobby of raising, breeding, selling and 
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showing Sheltie dogs. At time of trial, she owned seven (7) dogs. Further 
testimony established tha t she traveled to dog shows and was able to lift and 
pack as required to do this travel. Thus, the Finding tha t Wife "has not proven 
that she is unable to work", is clearly supported by the evidence. 
In summary, Wife did not present evidence tha t she is unab le to work to 
supplement her income; Husband does not have the ability to provide for her 
financial need; and given tha t Husband was doing at time of trial what he had 
been doing for eighteen (18) years , a refusal to impute addit ional income to him 
is consistent with the s t andard of living enjoyed by the par t ies dur ing the 
marriage. Thus , the refusal to award alimony is not a clear a n d prejudicial 
abuse of discretion, and the order should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE LABOR OF A SPOUSE ON HIS OWN SEPARATE AND 
INHERITED PROPERTY DOES NOT TRANSFORM THAT 
PROPERTY INTO JOINT PROPERTY. 
Wife does not d ispute tha t two (2) of the three (3) renta l propert ies were 
in fact acquired by the H u s b a n d as his inheri tance and began a s his separate 
property, tha t he kept them financially separate dur ing the marr iage , and that 
she did very little work on them. Instead, she argues tha t the property h a s 
somehow become joint property as a result of the Husband ' s "labor". The 
argument is contrary to the law and unworkable a s a new legal theory. 
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Further, in a divorce action, "[tjrial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining. . . property distribution. . ., and will be upheld on appeal unless a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated/' Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker 176 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Howell v. Howell 
806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (UT Ct. App. 1991).) This court "will alter the trial court's 
property division 'only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of law 
resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as 
to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Kunzler v. Kunzler 190 P.3d 497 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (other citations omitted).) 
Wife recognizes that the "general rule" relating to division of property is 
that equity requires each party retain what he or she brought into the 
marriage. However, this separate property can become marital property 
subject to division if the other spouse has enhanced, maintained or protected 
it. 
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this court stated: 
The general rule is that equity requires that each party retain the 
separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including 
any appreciation of the separate property, (citations omitted.) 
Exceptions to this rule include whether the property has been 
commingled, whether the other party has by his or her efforts 
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augmented, maintained or protected the separate property, and 
whether the distribution achieves a fair, just and equitable result. 
Id. at 1320. (See also Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah ] 988) and Lee 
v. Lee, 45 P.3d 176 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).) 
Nowhere does the law provide that a spouse receiving separate property 
is at risk for making it marital by his or her own labor to improve that property. 
Such a result is untenable. Instead, the only way for Wife to prevail that the 
rental properties have become marital property subject to division, is for Wife to 
show that by her efforts or investment she has augmented, maintained or 
protected the properties. She admits she did not. Instead, she argues that 
Husband was such a bad husband, being "chronically underemployed" during 
the marriage by working on these properties and not getting an independent 
job, that she should be entitled to a share in the properties. Following this 
argument to its logical conclusion, any spouse with separate property must 
ignore that property and do no work on it in order for it to remain his or her 
separate property. 
In the argument in Wife's brief on this issue, she makes several 
misstatements of fact. On page 25, Wife argues that "this investment property 
was enhanced, maintained and protected through the efforts, both physical 
and monetary, of both parties." There is no support in the record for this 
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statement. Instead, with each of the three (3) rental properties, the evidence is 
clear that: 
A. Husband maintained title solely in his name; 
B. Husband opened and maintained bank accounts for each property, 
solely in his name; 
C. Husband did all of the work in improving the properties, either 
personally or by obtaining and supervising subcontractors; 
D. All expenses of the properties and the costs of all improvements 
were paid either from the proceeds of the properties or from loans obtained on 
the properties in the Husband's sole name; 
E. Wife's name was not on any bank account and she had no access; 
F Wife did not contribute financially to any of the properties; 
G. Wife did no work personally on any of the properties with the 
exception of one-half (1/2) day painting at 149 South, for which there was a 
dispute as to whether Husband paid her for her time. Wife did testify that one 
(1) time she wallpapered at Truman and cleaned up there a couple of times. 
Husband denied she did any work on Truman; 
H. Wife never showed or rented the properties and she never collected 
rent; and 
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L Wife referred to the type of tenants these properties attracted as 
"those people" and would not allow Husband to use the parties' home 
telephone number in advertisements to rent the properties. 
It is clear that the properties were not enhanced, augmented, maintained 
or protected by any efforts of the Wife, and the conclusion that they remained 
the separate property of the Husband and the award of the properties to him, 
free and clear of any claim by the Wife, is well supported by the evidence and 
the law. 
The cases cited by Wife in support of her argument are distinguishable 
from this case: 
1. In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Wife 
resigned from her employment during the marriage to travel with Husband, 
perform secretarial and bookkeeping services for his corporation, entertain his 
associates, and she had sole responsibility for the household allowing Husband 
to work sixty to seventy hours a week. (See Id. at 1316-1318.) 
2. In Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Husband 
was awarded part of the appreciated value of Wife's premarital home because 
he finished the basement, constructed a patio deck and improved the 
landscaping. Id. at 135. It is clear that, in Barber and unlike this case, the 
other spouse did in fact improve, maintain and augment the property. 
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3. In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), the issue was whether a loan taken out by Husband on a building which 
was his separate property entitled Wife to one-half (1/2) of the appreciation on 
the building over the course of the marriage. This court noted that in Answers 
to Interrogatories and on appeal, Husband argued that the loan was to make 
improvements to the building, but at trial, he denied this and indicated that 
the loan was a marital debt, used for family expenses. The Court of Appeals 
refused to overturn the trial court given this inconsistency, the fact that the 
trial court is in a better position to judge the credibility of witnesses, and 
Husband had not marshaled the evidence on appeal. This case is hardly 
precedent supporting Wife's arguments in this appeal. 
4. In Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Husband 
paid off a loan on his separate property with marital funds, thus commingling 
the asset. Id. at 56. In this case on appeal, Husband used only income from 
the two (2) inherited rental properties to pay loans on those properties. 
The evidence in this case is quite simple. Husband inherited 149 South 
and Truman and kept the property separate throughout the marriage. Wife did 
nothing to augment, enhance or protect it. The trial court's Findings that 149 
South 800 East and 244-250 Truman Avenue remained Husband's separate 
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property and tha t they should be awarded to him free and clear of any claim by 
Wife should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED WIFE'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
At trial, Wife sought an award of her at torneys fees, which award was 
denied. On appeal, she correctly sets forth the s tandard for such a n award. 
Quoting Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476 (UT App. 2008), Wife 
acknowledges tha t "[ujnder Utah law, an award of attorney's fees m u s t be 
based on 'the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other 
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees'". (Id. a t 491) 
(quoting Oliekan v. Oliekan 147 P.3d 464 (Utah Ct. App. Ct. 2006) ) 
Despite reciting the appropriate legal s tandard , Wife then argues tha t she 
is entitled to fees because of Husband ' s bad acts , including his "continuing and 
unreasonable refusal to recognize the t rue level of his income and to 
acknowledge the marital character of the property." (See page 21 of Wife's 
Appellate Brief.) Wife goes on to say the she should be awarded fees because of 
"the serious 'unreport ing' of an accurate picture of the Respondent ' s rental 
income and expenses . . ." Wife further insis ts she is entitled to fees because of 
Respondent 's efforts to "freeze out" the Petitioner financially dur ing the 
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litigation, his failure to compromise on alimony and for being "obstructive" on 
his claim of separate property. 
Perhaps first and foremost, there is no evidence to support any of these 
allegations, and in fact the evidence resulted in the Husband prevailing at trial 
on the "true level of his income" and the "character of his marital property". 
There was no evidence of any "unreporting" of income and expenses before the 
trial court except Wife's testimony that she was "nervous" about filing joint tax 
returns. Attorneys fees are not awarded based upon a party's failure to 
compromise on an issue. And finally, given the simple poundage of paperwork 
submitted by Husband, which included the tax returns, copies of receipts and 
checks, and copies of checking accounts relating to the income and expenses of 
the properties, there can be no argument that the Respondent was 
"obstructive". 
Looking at the legal requirements for an award of attorneys fees, each 
party had a need for attorneys fees; Husband does not have sufficient monthly 
income to pay Wife's attorneys fees; and as Wife agreed at trial, there is no 
account or fund from which the Husband could pay Wife's fees. 
The best source for Wife to pay her fees was the equalizing property 
settlement payment in the amount of $9,673 which she received. The order 
that each party pay their own attorneys fees is amply supported by the 
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evidence, and by which party prevailed, and it is not an abuse of discretion or 
error. It should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Wife raises three (3) primary issues on appeal. It is clear that her 
underlying premise is that her husband was a "bum" during the marriage, 
being "chronically underemployed". Thus, even though he has consistently 
worked the same self employment, and even though he does not have the 
ability to pay her alimony, the court should impute income to him for his "bad" 
conduct throughout the course of the marriage. When the conduct at issue did 
not change for eighteen (18) years of a marriage, that same conduction is not a 
factor in determining alimony. Applying the factors set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5, the trial court was correct in refusing to award Wife alimony. 
As with alimony, when Wife argues that the court erred in awairding 
Husband the two (2) rental properties he inherited, she believes she is entitled 
to it because she suffered through an eighteen (18) year marriage where 
Husband was "chronically underemployed". There is no dispute that Wife did 
nothing to augment, enhance, protect or improve the properties in any way, yet 
she argues she should benefit from Husband's "labor". Wife cannot bootstrap 
her way to an interest in Husband's separate assets by using Husband's own 
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labor, and each of the cases she cites in her brief are dist inguishable from this 
case on appeal. 
And, finally, for a t torneys ' fees, Wife bypasses the legal s tandard and 
argues she is entitled to fees due to Husband ' s bad acts dur ing this litigation. 
There were no such bad acts . 
This court should affirm the trial court 's orders in all respects, 
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